D'una objectivitat provisional a una ética universal

Abstract

This article defends the possibility of establishing credible or veritable knowledge with the aim of becoming generalized, even if that does not mean the establishment of absolute, inherent, unquestionable truths about social reality. Taking into account these general elements, the author attempts to demonstrate, starting from the points of view of Rorty, de Searle and Habermas different positionings with regard to reality, language and the possibility ---or not--- of generating objective, scientific knowledge, thus knowledge that can be generalized, about social reality. Finally, we will see (rom Habermas' theoretical positioning that this author constructs a theoretical-methodological aparatus which he endows with the values and norms of that degree of generalization and universalization which, for him, scientific knowledge possesses. That is, if it turns out that values or norms do not have the status of "truth", how can scientific knowledge have that status, which speaks of univeral rights or norms and of universal constitutions?